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Security of Tenure in Social Housing in England 
The Localism Act 2011 granted social landlords in England the right to award fixed 
term (flexible) tenancies, thereby ending the right of new tenants to a secure tenancy.  
Reform was justified via reference to a revisionist critique of social housing, which 
accused security of tenure of promoting dependency, undercutting social mobility and 
preventing the effective operation of the sector as a welfare service.  This paper draws 
on empirical evidence from qualitative interviews with more than 140 social tenants to 
explore the legitimacy of these claims and consider the potential impact of ending 
security of tenure on the well-being of tenants.  Analysis reveals security of tenure to 
be a source of stability that helps mediate the precariousness of life on low incomes.  In 
conclusion, it is argued that policy should be looking to extend, rather than curtail, 
these benefits through an improved rental housing offer. 
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Introduction 
Security of tenure has been a feature of social housing in England for more than 30 years.  
The 1980 Housing Act established for the first time a clear set of legal rights for social 
tenants, including the right of council tenants to stay in their accommodation for as long as 
they kept to the terms of the tenancy agreement with their landlord.  The Housing Act 1988 
introduced assured tenancies for housing association and housing cooperative tenants, 
which grant similar rights to secure tenancies.  The right of a social tenant to a secure 
tenancy remained largely intact until the Localism Act 2011 granted social landlords the right 
to award fixed term ('flexible') tenancies.  These will normally be for a minimum of five years, 
but can be granted for as little as two years in certain circumstances. 
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Various arguments have been put forward to justify ending security of tenure.  It has been 
accused of being a corrupting influence, undercutting personal responsibility and promoting 
welfare dependency, and blamed for serving as a brake on social mobility by thwarting 
residential mobility.  It has also been criticised for preventing the effective operation of social 
housing as a welfare service, by allowing people to remain in the sector regardless of 
whether or not they have an on-going need for the help and support that the sector provides.   
This paper draws on empirical data from qualitative interviews with more than 140 social 
tenants in England to consider the legitimacy of these claims.  It also explores the largely 
ignored role that security of tenure can play as a social good.  Discussion begins with a 
review of the criticisms levelled at security of tenure and the reforms introduced by the 
Localism Act 2011.  Attention then turns to focus on the significance of security of tenure to 
the experiences, opportunities and well-being of a sample of social tenants.  A final section 
considers the implications of the findings for policy.  Throughout the paper, social housing is 
the term used to refer to publically funded housing owned by either a local authority (council 
housing) or a housing association, managed by a local authority, Arm's Length Management 
Company or a housing association and which is typically let at sub-market rents to people in 
housing need.   
The Revisionist Agenda and Security of Tenure 
In recent years, discussion and debate about the role and purpose of social housing in 
England has been dominated by a 'revisionist' perspective, rooted in the opinion that it is 
time to say goodbye to the sector as we know it (Cole, 2007).  Revisionist analysis accuses 
social housing of failing to fulfil its potential as a support mechanism for the poor and 
vulnerable and of being a destination, rather than a launch pad (Stroud, 2010).  This 
perspective is consistent with the dominant logic framing welfare policy in England, which 
demonises public welfare as a major factor underpinning the reproduction of poverty 
(Mooney, 2007).  Its roots can also be traced back to the New Right critique of public 
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provision of housing in the 1980s, which criticised the design, ownership, management and 
control of council housing (Coleman, 1985) and adjudged the public sector to be inefficient, 
wasteful, and costly and to undermine the life chances of tenants by limiting mobility (Adam 
Smith Institute, 1983).   
Articulated in a series of opinion pieces and think-tank reports (CIH, 2008; Dwelly, 2006; 
Greenhalgh and Moss, 2009; Housing and Dependency Working Group, 2008; Public 
Services Improvement Group, 2007; Stroud, 2010), the revisionist critique of social housing 
has championed a reduction in tenant rights and increase in conditionality.  The stated 
ambition is the creation of a sector that increasingly serves as respite provision for people 
who have fallen on hard times and need help 'turning around' their lives, rather than a 
destination tenure (Robinson, 2013).  Central to this is an end to security of tenure. 
Three particular criticisms have been levelled at security of tenure.   First, it is presumed to 
create dependency on the state and undercut personal responsibility.  Reliant on the state, 
tenants have no experience of the consequences of their behaviour or financial actions.  
Security of tenure is argued to even allow "tenants to continue with a poor payment record 
and anti-social behaviour" (Public Services Improvement Group, 2007: 138).  Second, 
security of tenure represents one of the few assets that many tenants possess and they cling 
to it with grim determination.  Unable to move within the sector because of the difficulties 
securing a transfer and unwilling to move outside the sector and forego this asset, residential 
mobility and, consequently, social mobility are presumed to be thwarted.  As a result, some 
of the poorest in society become concentrated on social housing estates where positive role 
models are few and far between.  Living in these "dead-end ghettos", tenants and their 
families become "trapped into a vicious cycle of deprivation and corresponding poor 
educational attainment and ill health" (Public Services Improvement Policy Group, 2007: 
122).   
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The third key criticism of security of tenure is that it prevents social housing from serving as 
an effective and efficient support mechanism for poor and vulnerable households.  The 
scarce resource that is social housing is allocated on a secure, long-term basis, based on an 
assessment of need undertaken at one particular moment in a person's life.  Some 
vulnerabilities might be permanent or long term, but others can reduce in severity or even 
disappear with time.  There is little opportunity for the system to take account of such 
changes in a tenant's situation.  The sector therefore becomes 'silted up' with households 
whose housing needs and personal vulnerabilities may no longer warrant the support of 
social housing.  Meanwhile, people in 'genuine need' struggle to access the sector, resulting 
in a growing waiting list.   
The revisionist solution is to recast the role and function of the social rented sector, creating 
a more 'flexible', 'responsive' and 'effective' social housing sector.  Central to this is the move 
to a more time limited system of support targeted at those in immediate need.  This might 
involve social landlords making an offer of housing until a tenant's "crisis is resolved and 
they are well on the pathway to independence" (Housing and Dependency Working Group, 
2008: 54).  Support and training could be provided alongside positive incentives for people 
to work and behave (Greenhalgh and Moss, 2009).  The sector could then serve as a 
springboard for social mobility, promoting a "virtuous circle of independence" (Greenhalgh 
and Moss, 2009: 53), which will serve to turn people's lives around and propel them along a 
pathway to self-sufficiency; a "dynamic resource, helping people to get on their feet and on 
with their lives", which provides a "temporary home before private renting, moving on when 
possible to shared equity, or outright ownership" (Stroud, 2010: 7).   
The Localism Act 
The Conservative Party policy paper 'Nurturing Responsibility' (The Conservative Party, 
2010) drew directly on the rationales of the revisionist agenda to argue that living in social 
housing promotes dependency, dampens aspirations and hampers mobility.  In response, it 
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called for action to ³tackle the effect that long-term residence in social housing has on the 
prospects of «tenants" and to ensure they "are not trapped into a cycle of deprivation with 
QRµH[LW¶RSSRUWXQLWLHV´ (The Conservative Party, 2010: 7 & 19).  Liberating tenants from this 
'trap' would, it was argued, serve to recast social housing as a "stepping stone to owner 
occupancy´ (The Conservative Party, 2010: 19).  Following the formation of the Coalition 
government in 2010, this logic was mainstreamed into housing policy in England.   
Shortly after the election, the Prime Minister raised the possibility of an end to security of 
tenure, observing ³There is a question mark about whether, in future, we should be asking 
when you are given a council home, is it for a fixed period? Because maybe in five or ten 
years you will be doing a different job and EHEHWWHUSDLGDQG\RXZRQ¶WQHHGWKDWKRPH\RX
will be able to go into the private sector´(Wintour, 2010).   The Minister for Housing 
expanded on this theme, referring to social housing as "a byword for failure" offering a 
"home for life in a dead end street" and expressing the desire to "restore pride to social 
housing, so that a social tenancy is once again seen as a launchpad to fulfil aspirations" 
(DCLG, 2011).  The Localism Act 2011 sought to deliver on this ambition. 
The Localism Act introduced major reforms to social housing, limiting the rights of tenants 
and increasing the freedom of landlords to manage their stock as they see fit.  These 
included restrictions on who can access social housing and limits on the rights of new 
tenants.  Access to the sector was restricted by granting local authorities greater discretion 
over who is allowed onto the waiting list for social housing.  The stated aim was to prevent 
people with no 'need' of social housing from joining the waiting list, thereby rationing access 
to a resource for which demand outstrips supply; estimates suggest that 4.5 million people - 
one in every 13 people in England - are on a social housing waiting list (National Housing 
Federation, 2010).  In addition, the Act introduced reforms limiting access to social housing 
for homeless people, by allowing local authorities to meet their statutory duty to homeless 
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people by placing them in private rented accommodation, rather than allowing homeless 
people in priority need to exercise a preference for a secure social tenancy.  
The Localism Act also granted  social landlords the right to award fixed-term (flexible) 
tenancies for a minimum period of two years, although it is suggested that the tenancies will 
typically be for five years other than in 'exceptional circumstances'.  New rules also permit 
landlords to charge 'affordable rents' at 80 per cent of the local market rent on these new 
tenancies.  The circumstances in which flexible tenancies will be used should be set out in a 
new tenancy strategy, which local authorities are required to publish.  The expectation is that 
the decision to renew a flexible tenancy for another fixed term will be informed by a review of 
a tenant's situation.  For example, if a tenant's financial situation has improved or if children 
have grown up and left home and the tenant is deemed to be under occupying the property, 
the decision might be taken not to renew the tenancy.  In this event, the landlord must inform 
the tenant six months before the term is due to end and provide appropriate advice and 
assistance to help the tenant find alternative accommodation. 
Early reports suggested that as many as three quarters of housing professionals were 
opposed to fixed term tenancies (Bury, 2010) and a Tenant Participation Advisory Service  
survey revealed that 77 per cent of members surveyed were opposed to the ending of 
lifetime tenancies (Duxbury, 2011).  Legal experts also warned that flexible tenancies will be 
vulnerable to legal challenge and difficult and resource intensive to enforce (Duxbury, 2011).  
However, 18 of the largest twenty five housing associations in England surveyed in 2011 
shortly after the introduction of the Localism Act indicated an intention to implement flexible 
tenancies (Duxbury, 2011). The rationale cited by these 18 landlords was that fixed term 
tenancies will afford them the flexibility they need to tackle an escalating waiting list. 
Among local authorities, there appears to be a split in attitudes to flexible tenancies along 
political lines.  In one survey, of the 29 local authorities rejecting fixed term tenancies, 25 
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were Labour controlled, while 12 of the 16 reported as supporting fixed tenancies were 
Conservative controlled (Brown, 2013).  In London, for example, Conservative controlled 
Hammersmith and Fulham was among the first local authorities to announce their intention 
to adopt flexible tenancies and issued proposals suggesting that most tenancies will be 
granted for five years, although certain groups, including tenants between 18 and 25 years 
old, will be offered fixed term tenancies for as little as two years. Outlining the authority's 
rationale, a senior officer drew on revisionist rhetoric, stating that "We want to give people a 
hand up, not a hand out.  We want to incentivise residents to make the most of the their 
lives" and claiming that "the current system does not promote personal aspiration or provide 
tenants with any incentive to try to move into home ownership and does not make the best 
use of the housing we have." (Ramesh, 2012).  In contrast, Labour controlled Islington and 
Camden councils have declared that they have no intention of introducing fixed term 
tenancies, the executive member for housing in Islington stating that such a move "tends to 
suggest that social housing is a transitory tenure" but that "in Islington we want to offer 
people a home for life." (Merrick, 2012).  It might be expected that this divergence would be 
championed by government as evidence of localism in action and an inevitable consequence 
of rolling back central government involvement, enabling local authorities to drive local 
priorities and freeing social landlords to manage as they see fit.  However, the Minister for 
Housing has called for local authorities to make better use of the 'flexibilities' they have been 
granted by the Localism Act when developing their tenancy strategy and to grant fixed term 
tenancies (Brown, 2013).  Discussion below considers the potential consequences for social 
tenants of the government's promotion of these new 'flexibilities'. 
Data 
This paper explores the legitimacy of the revisionist case against security of tenure and 
considers the potential costs of ending security of tenure through the analysis of qualitative 
data collected during a major programme of research exploring reasons for the relatively 
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high levels of worklessness within the social rented sector (Bashir et al., 2011; Fletcher et al., 
2008;).  Data were collected during two rounds of qualitative interviewing.  The first round 
involved in-depth interviews with 107 social tenants living in concentrated and pepper-potted 
areas of social housing in four locations (Derby, Islington, Peterborough and Sheffield) and 
30 interviews with private rented tenants in the same areas, to provide a point of contrast 
and comparison.  The second round of interviews focused on the work-related situations and 
experiences of social tenants with dependent children and involved repeat interviews with 12 
respondents from the first phase of the study and additional interviews with 38 new 
respondents in Derby and Islington.   
Access was secured through housing and employment related service providers and the use 
of snowballing techniques.  Particular attention was paid to ensuring the inclusion of key 
groups known to experience higher levels of worklessness - single young people, lone 
parents, couples with children - and to ensure ethnic diversity within the sample.  Wherever 
possible, interviews were recorded and subsequently transcribed into verbatim text.  The 
interviews focused on exploring the relationship between social housing and work.  However, 
the security associated with living in social housing emerged as a recurrent theme in the 
reflections, comments and observations of social tenants.  It is these insights that are 
analysed in this paper. 
Experiences of Security of Tenure 
Many respondents talked explicitly about security of tenure when asked about any benefits 
associated with living in social housing .  This was a consistent finding across the sample 
(men and women; young and old; in and out of employment; people from different 
ethnicities).  The benefits of security of tenure were frequently explained through reference 
to the very different situation in the private rented sector.  The Housing Act 1996 made 
assured short hold tenancies the default tenancy in the private rented sector.  Assured short 
hold tenancies are fixed-term lettings of at least six months, at the end of which the landlord 
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can regain possession unless they renew the tenancy.  If a new tenancy is not signed the 
landlord can regain possession at any time after six months after giving a minimum period of 
two months' notice.  The Chartered Institute of Housing (2008) has argued that all the 
conditions that allow social housing to provide a secure platform from which people can look 
to access greater opportunity and improve their lives can apply to people living on insecure 
tenancies in the private rented sector.  Findings from this research suggest otherwise.   
Respondents were not necessarily clear about the legal rights and responsibilities of a 
private tenant, but the general consensus was that private renting represents a more 
insecure housing tenure.  Respondents often reported that private landlords frequently 
exercise their right to terminate or to not renew assured short hold tenancies, promoting a 
sense of uncertainty and insecurity: 
You see the thing with private housing is sometimes they say that someone else 
wants to have a look or someone else wants to rent, just let us come at short 
notice, then they want you to leave the house.  When they give you this sort of 
WURXEOHWKHQLQP\PLQG,¶PWKLQNLQJµZHOO ,¶PJRLQJWRKave to run from place to 
SODFH¶ DQG\RXVHHZLWK WKH FRPSDQ\ >VRFLDO ODQGORUG@ QRZ WKH\¶UHQRW OLNH WKDW
EHFDXVHDVORQJDV\RXFRQWLQXHWRJLYHWKHPWKHUHQWWKH\¶UHQRWJRLQJWRWKURZ
\RXRXWWKH\¶OO OHDYH\RXWKHUHIRUDVORQJDV\RXFDUU\RQSD\LQJWKe rent. You 
VHHZLWKWKHSULYDWHODQGORUGVLW¶VDOODERXWWKHLURZQchoice; whenever they want 
WRWKH\FDQDVN\RXWROHDYH,GRQ¶W¶WKLQNLW¶VYHU\VDIHKDYLQJDSULYDWHODQGORUG
(36 year old unemployed man, married with one dependent child, Derby) 
 
with the Council and stuff they give you a long-term contract.  With a private 
landlord, the most you ever get out of them is twelve months.  But mine was 
always a six-PRQWKFRQWUDFW$IWHUVL[PRQWKVKH¶GUHQHZWKHFRQWUDFWLIKHZDV
VDWLVILHG « DIWHU VL[ PRQWKV KH FRXOG WXUQ URXQG DQG VD\ µ*HW RXW , DLQ¶W
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UHQHZLQJ LW¶DQG\RX¶UHVWXFN \HDUROGXQHPSOR\HGPDQPDUULHGZLWKRQH
dependent child, Derby)  
 
Some respondents pointed out that not even 'good tenants' who keep up with rental 
payments are free from these insecurities in the private rented sector, in contrast to the 
reported situation in social housing: 
<HDK , WKLQN ZKHQ \RX¶UH OLYLQJ LQ D FRXQFLO KRXVH UDWKHU WKDQ D SULYDWH UHQWHG
house, I would feel more secure in the council house because it is a long term 
FRQWUDFW \RX KDYH ZLWK WKHP ZKHUHDV LQ D SULYDWH RQH , ZRXOGQ¶W IHHO VHFXUH
EHFDXVH\RXGRQ¶WRZQWKDWKRXVHDQG\RXUODQGORUGDWDQ\PRPHQWPLJKWZDQW
WRVHOOLWZKHUHDV,WKLQNZLWKWKHFRXQFLOWHQDQF\\RX¶YHJRWWKDWVHFXULW\DQGVR
lonJDV\RXNHHSXSZLWK\RXU UHQWSD\PHQWV ,GRQ¶W WKLQN\RXZRXOGKDYHDQ\
problem. (51 year old woman, lone parent, unemployed, with one dependent 
child, Derby). 
 
Social tenants with more detailed knowledge of the private rented sector (from lived 
experience or second-hand accounts) also reported that private landlords were far more 
likely to evict tenants when faced with late payment of rent or accumulation of rent arrears: 
SULYDWH UHQW WKH\ FRXOG FKDUJH \RX RYHU , GRQ¶W NQRZ   D ZHHN DQG
H[SHFWKLVPRQH\ WKHUHDQG LI WKHUHZDVQRPRQH\ WKHUHKH¶GKDYH WKHEDLOLIIV
FRPHDORQJDQGFKXFN\RXRXWWKHSURSHUW\«LI\RXUHQWSULYDWHO\\RXNQRZ\RX
GRQ¶WKDYHDKRXVHEHFDXVHWKH\FDQNLFN\RXRXWDQ\WLPHEXWZLWKVRFLDOWKH\
\RXNQRZ\RX¶YHJRt longer term. (27 year old woman, lone parent, Austin, Derby) 
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Life as a private tenant was therefore characterised as being full of uncertainty, making it 
difficult to plan for the future.  In contrast, renting from a social landlord was presented as 
providing tenants with security and control, which emerged as a particular concern for 
tenants with young children: 
I know that you can buy a council house and you can live pretty safely and 
securely and you get lots of other support facilities with it, my children are young 
DQGZKDWLIVRPHWKLQJJRHVZURQJDQGDOVRWKHFRXQFLOGRHVQ¶WIRUFH\RXRXW,
PHDQ LI\RX¶UHUHQWLQJSULYDWHO\ WKHQ WKH\FDQ MXVW WKURZ\RXRXWDQ\ WLPH WKH\
MXVW KDYH WRJLYH\RXDELW RI QRWLFHDQGDVN \RX WR OHDYH WKDW¶V WKH WKLQJ with 
FRXQFLOKRXVHWKH\GRQ¶WGRWKDW,PHDQWKH\GRQ¶WGRWKH\,DOZD\VQHHGHGWR
IHHOVHFXUHEHFDXVHRIWKHFKLOGUHQQRWVRPHZKHUHZKHUH\RX¶YHJRWVL[PRQWKV
DQGWKHQ\RX¶YHJRWWRJHWRXWDQGWKHQ,¶YHJRWP\FKLOGUHQDQG,¶YHJRWWRILQG
somewhere WROLYH,NQRZWKDWLI,¶PLQDFRXQFLOKRXVHLW¶VDVHFXUHWHQDQF\
year old woman, lone parent, Derby) 
 
Interviewer: 'R \RX WKLQN WKHUH¶V DQ\ SDUWLFXODU EHQHILW WR &RXQFLO KRXVLQJ
over private housing? 
Respondent: <HK LW¶V ILIW\ SHU FHQW FKHDSHU DW OHDVW DQG \RX¶YH MXVW JRW QR
landlord, no-RQH¶VJRQQDFRPHLQ\RXUKRXVHDQGVD\WKLV WKDW ,W¶V\RXUSODFH
HIIHFWLYHO\XQWLO\RXPHVVLWXSEDVLFDOO\,W¶VQRWVRPHERG\HOVH¶VIODWWKDW\RX¶UH
ORRNLQJDIWHU LW¶V OLNH\RX¶UH ORRNLQJDIWHUVRPHERG\HOVH¶VIODW LI\RX¶UHUHQWLQJLW
from a [private] landlord.  After the six months is up he could say, "I don't want 
\RX WKHUH QR PRUH \RX¶YH JRWWD FKDQJH IODW ,W¶V OLNH RZQLQJ LW UHDOO\ >OLYLQJ LQ
VRFLDOKRXVLQJ@H[FHSW\RX¶YHMXVWJRWWDSD\WKHUHQW$fter a couple of years you 
can buy at a discounted rate. (23 year old single man, Islington) 
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This security and control was reported to have introduced a degree of stability into housing 
pathways that had previously been characterised by turbulence and uncertainty.  This 
observation is consistent with evidence of the stability inherent within the social rented sector; 
62 per cent of all social tenants in England have been resident in their current 
accommodation for more than five years, compared to only 20 per cent of private renters 
(DCLG, 2009).  This stability has been problematised by the proponents of reform, who 
presume residential mobility increases access to work and facilitates social mobility.  Our 
respondents spoke positively about the stability provided by social housing.   
Although there were examples of respondents keen to relocate to what they considered 
'better areas', residential stability had allowed many social tenants to develop rich local 
social networks and a sense of community. As other studies have revealed, such networks 
can be important in helping tenants 'get by' (Crisp et al., 2009; Mullins and Western, 2001).  
Contrary to the portrayal of social housing estates as 'dead-end ghettos', respondents also 
talked positively about life in their neighbourhood.  Sally, a 39 year old lone parent who was 
currently unemployed and looking for work in Islington, talked about valuing the local sense 
of community: 
Interviewer: <RX¶UHDGDPDQWWKDW\RXZRXOGQ¶WPRYH" 
Respondent: No. 
Interviewer: No?  Okay.  Why not? 
Respondent: Because I feel safe and secure where I am, I love the people.  I mean, 
like, two weeks ago ± was it two weeks ago? ± we had a big 40th 
anniversary party.  It was amazing. 
Interviewer: Was that somebody who lives on the ± 
Respondent: Yeh, because it was forty years old, the estate, and it was barbecue, 
DOOWKHNLGVURXQG,WKLQNZH¶UHVROXFN\LQWKDWVHQVHWKDWZKHUHLW¶V
like years ago when everybody was friendly, community spirited, and 
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WKDW¶VKRZLWLVURXQGWKHUH(YHU\RQHZDWFKHVHYHU\RQHHOVH¶VEDFN
1R,ZRXOGQ¶WPRYH 
 
The benefits perceived to be associated with security of tenure varied depending upon the 
personal situation, circumstances and priorities of respondents.  A key distinction was 
between people in work or actively seeking employment and people more distant from the 
labour market.  People more distant from the labour market often focused their comments on 
security of tenure as an important source of sustenance and support.  This was particularly 
the case for people whose lives had been characterised by turbulence, uncertainty and 
DVVRFLDWHGGLIILFXOWLHVµJHWWLQJE\¶7XUQLQJWKHLUEDFNRQWKHFKDOOHQJHVRIVHFXULQJDQG
maintaining a safe, secure place to live, these respondents talked about putting down roots 
and being able to focus on managing other challenges in their life, such as coping with ill 
health or disability, caring for children, looking after a sick relative or seeking out training and 
education.   
Tenants closer to the labour market reported that security of tenure served to render 
employment a more viable and realistic proposition.  Indeed, social tenants frequently 
focused on the issue of security of tenure when asked whether living in different housing 
situations makes it harder or easier to think about working.  A common refrain among 
tenants who had recently moved into the sector was that they were now settled and able to 
start thinking about work.  This was particularly true for people who had previous experience 
of insecure housing situations or turbulent lifestyles: 
Now I have my house here, I feel I can have more chance here than I have at the 
hostel. I have more chance here, if you put down either the hostel or the house, of 
course in my house I have more chance because you're more settled, not flitting 
off somewhere. (29 year old woman, lone parent, unemployed, Peterborough) 
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<RXFDQ¶WGRD MRE WKDWNLQGRIVLWXDWLRQ >KRPHOHVVQHVV@, FRXOGQ¶W IRFXVRQD
job while I had so much to sort out. It was too hectic.....It was only when I moved 
into my place that I could think about that [work]. (27 year old woman, lone parent, 
unemployed, Islington) 
 
The more sympathetic and supportive attitude of social landlords when dealing with tenants 
facing financial problems during the move from benefits into work was also reported to be 
important in supporting the move into employment.  This point was made by Hanna, a 25-34 
year old lone parent in Islington who was currently not working because of long term health 
problems: 
I definitely think that ,¶PLQWKHULJKWW\SHRIKRXVLQJLI,ZDVWRJREDFNWRZRUNEHFDXVH
,WKLQNLI,ZDVUHQWLQJSULYDWHO\WKHQ,¶GDOZD\VEHZRUULHGLI,ZDVEHKLQGRQWKHUHQWRU
anything like that whereas I could have a meeting with my housing manager and say 
µORRN,¶PKDYLQJDELWRIWURXEOHEXW,GRLQWHQGWRSD\ZKDW,RZH¶DQG,WKLQNWKH\¶GEH
more lenient and more understanding.  
 
In contrast, it was suggested that private landlords would not tolerate late or delayed 
payment of rent in such circumstances and concern was expressed about the speed with 
which private landlords move to evict tenants for rent arrears: 
Interviewer: Would your situation then be different if you were living in social rented 
accommodation? 
Respondent: <HDK,WKLQN,ZRXOGGHILQLWHO\JRIRUDIXOOWLPHMRE«WKHUHQWLVDORW
ORZHUDQG\RX¶UHVWLOOLW¶VWKHVHFXULW\QRERG\¶VJRLQJWRNLFN\RXRXW
and even if you do fall behind with arrears you go to them, talk to them 
DQGDSULYDWHODQGORUG\RXFDQ¶WGR WKDWEHFDXVHWKH\¶YHJRWWRSD\D
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PRUWJDJHDVZHOODWWKHHQGRIWKHGD\LW¶VQRWWKHLUIDXOWEXW\RX¶YHQRW
got security with private. (35-44 year old woman, private tenant Derby) 
 
The more understanding approach of social landlords was reported to allow tenants to 
consider insecure or casual work, where payment can sometimes be sporadic or delayed 
and which might be deemed too risky if they were living in the private rented sector.  
Discussion 
There is no doubting the relatively high levels of disadvantage, poor health and economic 
inactivity within the social rented sector (Hills, 2007).  Longitudinal analysis exploring the role 
of social housing in the lives of people as they move from childhood to adulthood has also 
revealed powerful correlations between a social housing tenancy and various aspects of 
disadvantage (Feinstein et al., 2008; Lupton et al., 2009).  Revisionist analysis presumes 
that these associations speak volumes about the damage wrought by social housing.  This is 
to confuse correlation with causality.  It is not possible to be sure that growing up in social 
housing caused the different social outcomes observed or that the alternatives (such as 
private renting) would have been any better (Lupton and Tunstall, 2009).  Neither is it 
possible to be sure that high levels of disadvantage in social housing are nothing more than 
the consequence of access to the sector being rationed on the basis of vulnerability and 
housing 'need'.  Furthermore, history tells us that negative correlations are not inevitable or 
inherent to the provision of housing by the public sector (Feinstein et al., 2008).  In short, 
there is no reliable evidence that living in social housing is a cause of social disadvantage 
(Robinson, 2008).  Meanwhile, the experiences highlighted above suggests that living in 
social housing can, in fact, help mediate the precariousness of life on low incomes.   
The social tenants interviewed recognised and valued the stability, confidence and control 
provided by security of tenure.  Better able to predict their housing future, respondents 
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reported being better placed to manage other challenges in their life.  For some people, this 
included the challenge of finding work, a proposition rendered more realistic and realisable 
as a result of the stability afforded by security of tenure.  Ending security of tenure risks 
undermining this positive work incentive.  Increased mobility also risks disrupting local 
networks of friendship and association that can be so important in helping people to cope 
and get by in the context of deprivation and disadvantage (Crisp et al., 2010).  This includes 
the informal support and assistance with childcare provided by family and friends that can 
serve to make work a viable option for some parents.  There is also the risk that ending 
security of tenure will introduce perverse incentives into the system, which mediate against 
labour market engagement.  As Hills (2007) points out, the threat that a tenancy might end if 
an individual's circumstances are deemed to have improved as result of securing and 
sustaining employment could serve as a disincentive to work.  This is rendered all the more 
likely by the fact that the only realistic alternative for most people leaving the social rented 
sector is the private rented sector, where insecurity, low levels of decency and the cost of 
renting result in it containing the highest proportion of households of any tenure in England 
who want to live in another tenure (Scanlon and Whitehead, 2011).   
The increased mobility and associated disruption caused by ending security of tenure is also 
likely to impact on the health and well-being of social tenants and, in particular, their children.  
Analysis has revealed residential mobility in childhood to have an adverse association with 
health outcomes through the life course, including: higher levels of behavioural and 
emotional problems; increased teenage pregnancy rates; accelerated initiation of illicit drug 
use; adolescent depression; and reduced continuity of healthcare (Jellyman and Spencer, 
2008).  Instability also appears to have a negative impact on the education of children, 
official statistics highlighting a gap in attainment at key stage 4 (aged 16) between mobile 
and non-mobile pupils (DCLG, 2006).   
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Fixed term tenancies are also likely to raise various management headaches for social 
landlords.  The stable neighbourhoods that landlords strive to create and maintain will be 
disrupted by increased turnover, which can undercut social ties and community networks 
DQGWKUHDWHQLQIRUPDOVRFLDOFRQWURO%DLOH\HWDO7KHOLNHOLKRRGWKDWµEHWWHURII¶
tenants who are presumed to no longer be in need of social housing will be required to move 
out of the sector will also serve to increase polarisation (Hills, 2007) and cut against the 
grain of efforts to promote social mix in a bid to raise the social capital of residents and 
diminish social exclusion (Cole and Goodchild, 2000).  In addition, there is the challenge of 
managing flexible tenancies, which is likely to be demanding on landlord resources (Duxbury, 
2011). 
Conclusion 
Demand for social housing outstrips supply.  The government response focuses on limiting 
demand.  This involves restricting access to the sector and limiting the right of occupancy.  
Ending security of tenure is central to these efforts.  The evidence presented here suggests 
that introducing fixed term tenancies in the social rented sector will risk undermining the 
social and economic well-being of tenants and their families.  The resulting increase in 
turnover is also likely to impact on neighbourhood well-being, undercutting feelings of 
attachment and eroding social cohesion. The Coalition Government and some housing 
professionals have chosen to ignore these points.  Wedded to the revisionist perspective, 
they plough on with reforms designed to limit the rights of tenants (the one notable exception 
being the enhanced inducements to tenants introduced in a bid to reinvigorate the Right to 
Buy programme). 
Rather than limiting security of tenure, these findings suggest that policy should be seeking 
to extend the benefits of security and stability to greater numbers of households as part of a 
wider effort to provide a better rental housing offer.  One response would be to increase the 
supply of social housing.  This suggestion is not as fanciful as it might seem in an age of 
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austerity and public sector retrenchment, considering that during the four-year spending 
review period 2010-2014 £95bn will be spent on housing benefit (£30 billion of which will go 
to cover relatively high rents in the private rented sector), compared to just £4.5bn of capital 
investment in new affordable homes (Hull and Cooke, 2012).  This imbalance reflects a shift 
in spending on housing over the last 30 years from the funding of bricks and mortar to the 
subsidising of rents.  Reversing this trend could serve to facilitate a major increase in the 
supply of affordable social units.  Meanwhile, reform of the private rented sector, focusing on 
increasing security, improving living conditions and regulating rents, could help transform the 
sector into a tenure of long term stability and choice.  However, such reforms are unlikely to 
gain purchase within a policy debate dominated by the revisionist notion that tenant rights 
are part of the problem rather than the solution.   
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